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The question of method: practice, reflexivity and critique in visual culture studies Mieke Bal's essay 'Visual essentialism and the object of visual culture' is a rigorous commentary on what Bal calls 'the primary pain point' of visual culture studies (Bal, 2003: 6) . Bal argues that visual culture studies are founded on the specificity of their object of study, but at the same time are unclear about exactly what that object is.
Hence their 'pain', inflicted on Bal at least by the range of 'unquestioned assumptions' and even 'blatant nonsense' that substitute in visual culture studies for careful consideration of that object (Bal 2003: 11, 12 ). Bal offers her own analgesic, suggesting that the proper object of study for visual culture studies should in fact be a non-object: 'visuality' itself. For Bal, visuality becomes an object of study in moments of seeing, or 'visual event[s]' (9), when, in an encounter between a human subject and another entity, something emerges as 'a fleeting, fugitive subjective image accrued in the subject' (9). Her interest is therefore as much in 'performing acts of seeing' as in 'the materiality of the object seen' (11).
This essay uses Bal's argument to consider what Bal calls 'the question of method' (Bal 2003: 23) . In her essay, Bal claims that 'methodological reflection cannot be avoided at this time' (23) , and, indeed, 'method' is central to all of her work (as the collection of her essays edited by Norman Bryson attests [Bal and Bryson 2001] ). It is therefore entirely typical that she should introduce her concern with the 'visual event' and with 'performing acts of seeing' in the form of a question serving to generate particular sorts of evidence: with methodology, in other words. Her question is this: 'what happens when people look, and what emerges from that act?' (Bal 2003: 9) . And her essay is structured such that its arguments culminate in a section entitled 'the question of method'; 'methodology' is also a key word of her essay. 1 Yet, of the seven essays published in response to Bal, only three engage with the question of methodology, and that only very briefly: for example, in Griselda Pollock's passing and approving reference to 'modes of analysis' that 'reframe Art History's 2 precious authored objects as texts and theoretical practices' (Pollock 2003: 259) . I want to make three points in relation to this apparent uninterest in questions of methodology by Bal and her respondents. Firstly, I think Bal is correct to place so much importance on methodology, and I hope it will be obvious by the end of the chapter why this is the case. Secondly, though, it seems to me that the uninterest in questions of method shown by the responses to Bal's paper is symptomatic of a much wider uninterest in questions of method across the field of visual culture studies more generally (which is hardly surprising, since all of her respondents have been extremely influential in visual culture studies). Thirdly, this lack of interest in discussing questions of methodology seems to be caused by the hegemony of an implicit methodology. So for all the talk of interdisciplinarity and what can be done differently by working across established research boundaries, visual culture studies, I suggest, has remarkably little interest in methodological discussion or experimentation. So, for example, Pollock's refusal, quoted above, to consider art objects as objects denies the relevance to visual culture studies of a body of work which does indeed treat artworks (and other sorts of visualised materials) as objects, and also precisely as a means of avoiding questions of preciousness, authorship, aesthetics and connoisseurship. I am thinking here of work in anthropology, inspired in different ways by the work of Alfred Gell (1998) and Arjun Appadurai (1986) , among others, in which art is seen as less a matter of textual meaning and much more as a matter of social doing. In this work, artworks, and other visual objects, are conceptualised as visual objects possessing agency which, when encountered, produce compressed performances with social effect (for example Myers 2001; Pinney 2003 Pinney , 2005 Poole 1997; Thomas 1991) .
2 Yet this anthropological work is rarely referred to in visual culture studies (one exception being Bal herself (Pollock 2003: 259) ; and any site, using whatever methods, that achieves such contestation -as so much excellent work in visual culture studies has already done -is surely to be valued. However, particular methods achieve particular ends. And while the implicit methodology of so much visual culture studies to date has been very effective at certain forms of critique, it is perhaps time to ask whether that methodology alone remains fully adequate to addressing visual culture in all its richness and complexity. In particular, it seems to me that if visual culture needs to explore the rather different territory of visual events and performances of seeing -as, following Bal and others, I think it must -then different methodologies may well be required.
So in the second section of the paper, I build on aspects of Bal's own methodology.
But this paper is not absolutely faithful to Bal's position (if such a thing were possible). This is partly because her own methodology has already been elaborated by Norman Bryson (2001) , and there seems little point in repeating his remarks.
More significantly, though, as Bryson notes, Bal's methodology is based on examining the logic of 'discourse, enunciation and voice' as 'they are focalized or embedded in the actual discursive situation' (Bryson 2001: 19) . If visual culture studies is fully to engage with the consequences of Bal's move towards performance and event, this paper suggests that it also needs some methodological resources to enable it to say more than Bal can about the 'actual situation' emergent upon specific acts of seeing. These resources, I suggest, would focus less on the logic of 'discourse, enunciation and voice', and more on the logics of discourse, practice and place. In other words, I am suggesting that if visual culture studies is to look more closely at visuality as an event, it would benefit from being able to ask questions about the particularities of events as they take place in different locations with diverse human and artefactual actants. Gillespie (1995) , for example, are nowhere to be found in their account. 4 The third feature is also an absence: that of the visual culture studies critic. For surely there are actually four sites of meaning-making, the fourth being the critic who interprets the 'junctures and articulations of visual culture' (Bal 2003: 21) .
These three aspects of visual culture studies' methodology -a focus on meaning and interpretation, the absence of actual audiences, and a certain invisibility on the part of the critic -are accompanied by a fourth, which again is a legacy from Hall's version of cultural studies: a search for critique. This is particularly evident in my next example, which is a body of work addressing public art.
I'll begin with a quotation from a book chapter written by Patricia Phillips, a distinguished writer on public art (Phillips 2003) . She is discussing a mosaic in a In this example, it is also particularly clear that public art is being judged on the grounds of its political effect. In this case, Phillips claims that the mosaic represents public life as vigorously and multiply gendered and racialised, and assumes that this is a good thing. As Grant Kester points out in his book Conversation Pieces (2004), one criteria that dominates most (modernist) art criticism methodology is precisely whether an artwork resists 'dominant meanings', howsoever defined. The most highly valued artworks produced by much art criticism are those which are seen to resist the production of hegemonic meaning, to refuse to reproduce discourse, to destabilise the power-knowledge nexus. Critics expect that 'the work of art should challenge or disrupt the viewer's expectations about a given image, object, or system of meaning' (Kester 2004: 17) . This expectation very much at work in discussions of 7 what constitutes good public art, and, I would argue, in visual culture studies more generally. So, take just three of examples, Phillips (1996: 61) says that public art 'can be a form of radical education that challenges the structures and conditions of cultural and political institutions', Suzanne Lacey (1995: 13) claims that it should imply or state ideas about social change, and Jane Rendell (1999: 4) says that public art should provide 'moments, places and tools for self-reflection, critical thinking and radical practice'. In similar fashion, visual culture studies' implicit methodology also praises critique in the objects it sees. The objects that it valorises are those that pull their viewers out of their ordinary values and perceptions, and that is its fourth characteristic.
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Now, clearly such criticism is a valuable skill for building those 'sites of contestation'
demanded by Pollock and many other visual culture critics. However, we should perhaps be more aware than we are of some of its implications. One implication in particular deserves more attention, I think, which is the way in which this methodology enables its particular sort of critic to ignore what Toby Miller (2001) calls the 'occasionality' of 'visual events', in all their extraordinary variety. By 'occasionality', Miller means 'the conditions under which a text is made, circulated, received, interpreted, and criticized, taking seriously the conditions of existence of cultural production' (306). I would emphasise the importance of where a particular visual event takes place in particular: the 'same' object may participate in quite different visual events when it is in a family album and when it becomes part of mass media discourse of grief and blame (Rose forthcoming ). Yet the semiologicaldiscursive methodology of visual culture studies makes the occasionality of visual events difficult to explore. The focus on meaning and interpretation tends to lead to a methodological focus on the formal qualities and discursive context of visual objects; the uninterest in audiences leads to art objects in particular to being read as if where they were (not) seen was irrelevant; and the uninterest in the specific conditions and processes in which the critic is working produces claims about the meaning inherent to visual objects which ignores the particular conditions under which that claim is made. As Miller (2001: 307) notes, film theorists, for example, never discuss what difference it makes to their interpretation of 'the' meaning of a film that they watched it on a dvd-player, repeatedly, on their own, in an office or study -rather than seeing it once, on a large screen, at a packed multiplex on a 8 Saturday night. Finally, the urge to see things as critical means that vast swathes of visual events have simply never made it onto the visual studies agenda.
But if we think of an installation in an art gallery, or a family photograph album, or the latest blockbuster at a multiplex, and think of them, not solely in terms of their formal properties and philosophical implications, but also as located social, affective and economic events, then we will produce a rather different account of them: an account that can consider the importance of institutional context, of the people who funded, installed and looked at them, of the corporeal and discursive gestures and comportments by which they happen. We then start to have a rather different sense of such objects and how they are visible: not simply as a objects to be interpreted, but as remarkably complex objects that came into being only through the participation of numerous actors, both human and non-human. We might then also be more inclined to consider the critic as one of those actors, and reflect more carefully on their role.
In contrast to this approach to visual culture -which I will develop in the next section In the social sciences, the notion of 'practice' has a complex theoretical genealogy.
Importantly, it is not opposed to discourse: indeed, Foucault's work might be read as an extended meditation on practices as power (Laurier and Philo 2004) . However, the current interest in practice certainly draws on more than just Foucault for its Secondly, the performativity of practice. That is (following Butler 1990), practices produce the entities that are claimed to pre-exist the practice. While both, say, a Caravaggio painting and a gallery visitor (Bal 1996: 117-128) , or an on-line game and a gamer, may seem to exist prior to their mutual encounters, they do not; they constitute each other as they interact (and such interactions are not only visual, of course). Hence practices are relational. 'Performing acts of seeing' produce both seer and seen (Bal 2003: 11, 14) . And as performative, practices both discipline 12 these positions but slippages in their reproduction also occur. Bal has in fact offered examples of both of these possibilities, in the organisation of New York's museum district which inscribes a racialised distinction between Nature and Culture in the separate buildings of the American Museum of Natural History and the Metropolitan Museum of Art (Bal 1996:15-36) , and the relation between two paintings and their apparatus of display in one corner of a gallery (Bal 1996: 117-28) .
What this broad approach means for visual culture studies is significant, I would 
Reflexivity
Bal's argument has a certain version of reflexivity at its heart, and, like her emphasis on practice, this also has significant implications for the work of critical interpretation typical of so much of visual culture studies. Simply, reflexivity is central to Bal's position because visual culture critics are also people doing specific kinds of looking in particular places. The critic is not exempt from, or outside of, Bal's understanding of visuality as practice. Hence the work of critics must also be considered as embodied, located, relational and performative. Critics cannot simply apply their critical-theoretical tools onto objects understood as existing prior to the moment of criticism. Instead, objects are brought into particular forms of being through the act of criticism.
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The so-called empirical object does not exist 'out there' but is brought into existence in the encounter between object and analyst, mediated by the theoretical baggage each brings to that encounter. This transforms the analysis from an instrumentalist 'application' into a performative interaction between the object (including those aspects of it that remained invisible before the encounter), theory and analyst. In this view, processes of interpretation are part of the object and are, in turn, questioned on the side of the analyst. (Bal 2003: 23-4) The analyst brings certain questions and theories to bear on their object of study, and, Bal argues, the object often answers back, offering a particular and productive version of itself in this exchange from which the critic should learn (and hence Bal notes that 'some specificity for material objects must be retained' [Bal 2003: 15] ).
This understanding of the critic as essentially entangled in what they are studying is very different from the distanced analytical stand offered by connoisseurs of visual culture. It places the analyst much more in the midst of things, a participant in visualities rather than their detached observer.
Given this entanglement, Bal argues that an 'element of self-reflection is indispensable' to critical work (Bal, 2003: 24) . But Bal has quite a specific understanding of reflexivity. Reflexion, for Bal, means thinking of interpretive practices as both 'method and object of questioning' (24) . This sort of self-reflection is central to several other accounts of performative research methodologies (see for example Gregson and Rose 1999; Pratt 2000; Latham 2003) . Aspects of methodology are paused over, examined, rehearsed and revised, as the research process proceeds and things are learnt from the research objects. No longer simply passing a verdict in the mode of a 'colonising humanist' (Pratt 2000: 639) , the critic is now required to work through the process of reaching that verdict, demonstrating that it was attained through a series of specific interactions rather than from a series of cumulative revelations.
In my own work on what a particular group of mothers did with their family photos, for example, I interviewed women in their houses, looked at lots of their photos with them, and then worked with interview transcripts and notes. Eventually I made a 14 number of claims about the effects of family photos for these mothers, one of which depended on just such a moment of self-reflection. It wasn't until I'd been working with the transcripts for a couple of months that I suddenly realised that, in all the hours of conversation poring over thousands of photos, one topic was hardly ever discussed: what the children pictured so often felt about being photographed. It wasn't, it seemed, a pressing issue for the mothers taking the photos -and nor, significantly, had it been for me, as their interviewer, as a researcher working with interview material and also a mother myself. Reflecting on my complicity with this absence, I concluded that our shared uninterest in how children felt suggested that the real subjects of the photos weren't in fact the children at all, but the mothers, and what taking and looking (and holding) photographs of their children meant to them.
Questioning the range of my research questions allowed me to begin to explore why it is that, despite their predictable and banal content and its construction of traditional notions of 'the family', commented on by so many visual culture critics, family photos are intensely valued by so many mothers (Rose 2005) .
Another implication that needs teasing out from Bal's methodological position is that understanding research in terms of performative practices also makes the conclusions of research rather more provisional. This is not because -as some versions of reflexivity abroad in the social sciences would claim -every person is differently positioned and therefore sees things differently (although in certain circumstances and in specific ways this may well be important). Rather, it is because performances may in principle always be performed differently; there is always the possibility that looking again might change what is seen and unseen.
Interpretation is of the moment in which it was undertaken (Latham 2003 (Latham : 2005 .
Elsewhere, Bal (1999: 10) argues that this challenge to the epistemic authority of the critic should be central to visual culture studies, and that it can come both from the 'exposed object' and the reader/viewer.
Critique
So far, I have argued that understanding visual culture research as a practice demands a certain reflexivity from the researcher. It does so because it entangles the researcher as much as anyone else in practices and performances of looking.
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This is already a form of critique, I think; it offers a critique of those analytical positions that assume they are outside such social practices. It makes the 'third person' approach to visualised objects (Bryson, 2001: 5) Critique as intervention can thus be conceived of as a strategy aimed at describing, redescribing, combining and recombining elements of knowledge that may have critical effects. (Egeland, 2005: 269) Eric Laurier and Chris Philo, for example, note 'the surplus of detail provided by actual events at hand' (Laurier and Philo, 2004: 431) John Allen and Michael Pryke (1993) , for example, in a study of the spatialities of the City of London, were particularly interested in the parallel existence of two social worlds in the offices of the financial corporations they were studying. On the one hand, the well-paid world of the bankers: on the other, a world of very low-paid caterers, security guards and cleaners. The bankers' way of seeing their everyday workplace was such that those low-paid workers were simply invisible. They were not seen, and thus the reliance of the bankers upon them was denied. Allen and Pryke intervened in this invisibilisation by making a series of montages of the City space -its buildings and its information flows -into which they gradually inserted more and more evidence of the presence of the low-paid workers. This suggests that montage -whether written or using images -is one tactic of intervention; there are surely others (see for example Markussen, 2005) . Critique, then, need not only be a matter of finding a meaning and assessing its effect in relation to wider discursive formations. Critique can also take the form of finding what is already there and rearranging it 'to witness the world into being in quite different… ways' (Dewsbury, 2003 (Dewsbury, : 1908 .
Conclusion
One of the aims of this chapter has been to spell out rather more clearly than is usually the case what the implications are of the implicit methodology that dominates a great deal of visual culture studies. For implications it certainly has, both in the 17 kind of critic it creates, and in the kinds of accounts of visual objects it produces. It focuses almost entirely on the meaning of visual things, it ignores the places in and the subjectivities through which visual events happen, it neglects the particular positioning of the critic, and is desperate to find critique. The work that it does is nonetheless valuable, I would insist. It is important to have engaged and sustained readings of cultural texts that push at superficial undertstandings and offer new ways of thinking and seeing. I do not want to advocate any one method as inherently 'better' than the other. I simply want to emphasise that methodologies have effects, and that if visual culture studies is to come of age as a truly innovative interdisciplinary subject, it needs to pay much more attention to the consequences of its current implicit methodology, and to explore the interpretive possibilities offered by a range of other methodological strategies. To focus on the practices through which visual events happen is to go detailed. It is to look carefully at bodies, comportments, gestures, looks; to look and touch objects, I cannot claim that this more ethnographic approach to visual events is superior to the new connoisseurship currently dominating visual culture studies. However, in its move away from an approach to visualities still based largely on parallels with language, and its insistence that looking is a social act among humans and between humans and other things, can give us a different sense of visual culture which relies less on visual objects and more on the processes which animate them and make them matter. Clearly such a methodological focus on practice has its own challenges, which I have not discussed here: for example, methods to access human encounters with visualised objects are difficult to formulate, and describing what practices are happening is far from being an innocent operation. Nonetheless, I
would suggest that visual culture studies can only be enriched by experimenting with a practice-oriented methodology. interchangeably. Since 'method' tends usually to refer to more technical questions of analytical procedure, my sense is that she actually centres methodology in her work. However, since part of my argument is to emphasise the more procedural aspects of method as a consequence of considering methodology, I too shift between using these two terms in this paper.
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The phrase 'compressed performance' comes from Nicholas Pinney's paraphrase of Marilyn Strathern's work (Pinney 2004 ).
3
For example, in the opening pages of her 2003 essay she refers approvingly to the work of Arjun Appadurai (1986) , who is also very influential on the work of those anthropologists I mention, particularly Thomas (1991) . Similarly, in her edited collection The Practice of Cultural Analysis (Bal, 1999) , she works with an essay contributed by distinguished anthropologist Johannes Fabian. 5 Even in the case of 'new genre public art' (Lacey, 1995) , with its commitment to 'community involvement', there's still a tendency for artists to be the ones with the ideas while local people are simply asked to do the work. Indeed, this is the basis of Miwon Kwon's (2004) fairly devastating account of a major new genre public art project in Chicago a few years ago.
